sufficient power in the legal tribunals of the country to check much of what is euphemistically described as "advanced thinking." We do not underrate the difficulty of the task the Court would undertake in deciding whether the authority of the Scriptures had been impugned, a question which involves the construction of Scripture, whether an attack upon the evidences is an offence within the meaning of the Act, or whether the transcendental speculations of Dr. Cumming proceed upon a criminally erroneous view of Providence in the government of the world. But in Scotland at least we are free from a superstition which has haunted the minds of the English Judges, and to which Lord Mansfield gave expression when he said "the essential principles of Revealed Religion are part of the common law." Again, in the recent case of Milbourn (Law. Rep. 2 Ex. 230), the judgment of Kelly, C.B., feebly echoes this saying: "Christianity is part and parcel of the law of the land." However true all this may be, and if a Statute were passed tomorrow declaring the national faith in the personal existence of Satan, no light is thereby thrown on the subject of Blasphemy; for it is the right of all Her Majesty's subjects to criticise the law and institutions under which they live. Upon turning to Blackstone we find a passage eminently characteristic of institutional writing, inasmuch as the meaning is hard to find, and the authority therefore unquestionable: "Though 'tis clear that no restraint should be laid on national discussions of the rectitude and propriety of the established mode of worship, yet contumely and contempt are what no establishment can tolerate." Here religion is a mode of worship, a system of rites and ceremonies. The good Blackstone must have had prophetic visions of Ritualism, but he does not conceive the possibility of any respectable person believing or teaching a religious faith contrary to the one established. The labours of his commentator must be very great in these times of waxen candles and Disestablishment darkness.

An interesting question has, we believe, recently been raised in Glasgow, which illustrates the subject of this paper. A Unitarian minister publishes a Life of Christ for the Young, from which the supernatural element is almost wholly excluded. It is a book written without controversial aim, and apparently for the purpose of impressing the hearts of children with the graces of Christ's character. An evangelical missionary republishes this book, with the addition of a review or refutation. On the Unitarian applying for interdict against the sale of the pirated edition, the missionary pleads that the work in question is blasphemous, and that there can be no property in such a work which the law will recognise. This may sound startling to those long laid in the sleep of universal toleration, but there are several English decisions in support of it. Thus it was decided (Poplett, Ryan and Moody, 337) that the printer of a blasphemous work cannot recover the price of his labour; that a bookseller cannot recover the price of a copy from a purchaser (Fores, 4 Espinasse, 97); and that the publisher of such a work cannot protect his copyright against piratical infringement (Stockdale, 5 Barn. and Cr. 173). Nor are these decisions unreasonable. It may indeed be said that they confer a power upon the unscrupulous bookseller of pirating a book and then making his terms by the threat of a defence of blasphemy; and it might be added that in permitting the sale of the pirated edition the law is conniving at the blasphemous publication. But to this it may be replied that nothing can discourage a bookseller from putting his money in a book so much as the possibility that the profits will be reaped by another; while the law reserves its power to prosecute where the pirate does nothing more than republish.

Whatever may be the merits of the case we have mentioned, which may possibly come to the Supreme Court upon Appeal, it cannot fail to awaken serious questions as to the policy of attempting to enforce the Act of 1695. For that purpose it would be necessary to have an overwhelming majority in favour of prosecuting the blasphemous publication, and that upon the only possible ground of the divine truth of the doctrines protected by the Statute. If indeed these doctrines be true (which we presume a very small number of people in Scotland doubt), and if it be also true that they are so closely interwoven with the interests of justice and of social harmony as has been alleged, while the opposite errors necessarily lead to immorality and sin, then, though the task may be like the cleansing of the Augean stables, no good man could grieve were the Statute put in rigorous execution. No doubt much of our literature would disappear in the process. Positivist magazines and flippant treatises by literary dogmatists would have to make for the other side of the Channel. But it cannot be doubted that the regular infliction of fine and imprisonment would not merely render the blasphemies in question generally distasteful, but would finally put a salutary restraint upon the actual freedom of thought in that direction. This however would be clearly impossible, where any considerable minority conscientiously held the blasphemous opinion, without a severity of punishment which our modern humanitarianism would not tolerate. But the responsibility of acquiescence would be all the greater.

A new prophet indeed has risen in these latter days, preaching the Gospel of social intolerance in place of our old-fashioned notions of persecution. This gentleman (Mr. FitzJames Stephen, Q.C., in his Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, a book which all thoughtful men, and some legislators, will read with admiration of its calm and intrepid logic) has arrived at the conclusion that for the mass of men virtue (which includes veracity, justice, temperance, obedience, etc.) depends for its sanction chiefly on the fear of hell and on the hope of heaven. This "otherworldliness" may or may not involve a view of human nature coloured by familiarity with its more degraded forms, and inconsistent with an enlightened ethical analysis, but what concerns us here is that Mr. Stephen deduces from this premiss that we should all be socially intolerant towards those who disbelieve the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, or a future state of rewards and punishments: Most lame and impotent conclusion! If, as before, these doctrines be true, and the disbelief of them entails the consequences pointed out by Mr. Stephen, no punishment can be too severe to tear up the roots of so pestilent a tree of error. It is idle declamation to say that, because its extravagance is barred in a particular direction, the thinking faculty would be paralyzed. It is worse than declamation to suggest unregulated social intolerance, proceeding without clear view or consistent penalty, as a cure for principles which, according to Mr. Stephen, are poisonous to the very lifeblood of society. We are all familiar with a noble passage in Mr. J. S. Mill's Essay on Liberty, where he describes the disastrous inefficacy of Mr. Stephen's pet engine of intellectual and moral reform: "Our merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion." It will never silence an opinion which has once had the courage to express itself.

Whence comes then this natural feeling of hesitation on the part of all reasonable men to employ the existing law for the suppression even of the extreme cases of blasphemy supposed by Mr. Stephen ? Is it because the means are not adequate to the end in view? That is a mere question of vigorous administration of the law co-operating with general approval. Is it because the doctrines, which have been blasphemously denied, are not sincerely believed by the great bulk of the people? This is not the case certainly in Scotland. Nor is it because the silencing of an opinion has been wrongly said to involve the assumption of infallibility. Surely the simple and natural solution of the difficulty is this, that while the doctrines are warmly cherished, it is not believed that the blasphemers are immoral, or that there is any necessary connection between blasphemy and immorality. We do not here speak of those forms of blasphemy, which are unhappily not wholly unknown to the theological literature of the present day, and which rather fall under the words of the Statute, "railing and cursing against God." There is also a more harmless species of blasphemy, which gives balls and tea parties in honour of the memory of Tom Paine, "to be followed by a lecture on the sceptical tendency of Bishop Butler's Analogy!" Such was the case of Milbourn (already cited), who had hired certain rooms for a ceremony of this nature, when the scandalized proprietor repudiated the contract after advertisement on the ground of blasphemy. A learned Judge, in declaring the contract void, was careful to insist that while the law did not support such a contract, it might inflict no penalty on the blasphemous contractor. The logic of this is very doubtful. Humanity may suggest that when an author or preacher promulgates fairly what he considers to be true and for the benefit of others, that element of evil intention is wanting which is essential to complete a crime. And accordingly a distinguished lawyer says, "If it can be collected from the circumstances of the publication, from a display of offensive levity, from contumelious and abusive expressions applied to sacred persons and subjects, that the design of the author was to occasion that mischief to which the matters which he publishes immediately tendto destroy or even to weaken men's sense of moral or religious obligation, to insult those who believe by casting contumelious abuse and ridicule upon their doctrines, or to bring the established religion and form of worship into disgrace and contempt, the offence against society is complete" (Starkie on Libel, 496). It is obvious that this would not secure the end of the Blasphemy Statutes, nor would the want of malice be a relevant defence to an indictment under the Act 1695. But it is so obviously just that the wellmeant expression of belief should go unpunished, that we hardly think a Scotch Court would interfere to sanction a dishonest transaction because the injured party was afflicted with the malady of thought in theology. When we consider the diversity of mental constitutions in men, and the infinite extent of their necessary ignorance, it ill becomes any one to judge harshly concerning the things of the spirit. Mr. Stephen scoffs at the toleration of modern Liberalism, which he says is a compromise with covert unbelief. No doubt, thought and action are closely interwoven, but one might as well say, "I believe in infant baptism, therefore my neighbour, who doesn't, is a rogue." The cardinal virtues of the human mind, the deepest and strongest feelings of the human heart, conscience, temperance, justice, truthfulness, rest on another basis than the shifting sands of theological inquiry; and upon these virtues after all are built our social institutions. But it is a fallacy to confound the mutual charity, which now rules to a certain extent in matters religious, with the beginnings of religious scepticism. Let us hear on this point the simple, truthful words of Dr. Middleton (ii. p. 312-3): "Tis then my firm persuasion and principle that a free inquiry into all points of religion is always useful and beneficial, and for that reason never to be punished or prohibited. It opens the minds, and reforms the manners of the people: makes them sociable, reasonable, governable: easy to such as differ from them, and as little scandalized at the different opinions as the different complexions of their neighbour; whereas the restraint of this liberty, and the imposition of systems and articles, that must not be called in question, nourishes a churlish spirit of bigotry, uncharitableness, enthusiasm, which no civil power can moderate: a spirit that has so oft involved mankind in wars and bloodshed, and by turns endangered the ruin of every Christian country in the world." This is not the voice of the Church of Laodicea: it is the only position of a courageous intellect, giving the freedom which it takes. W. C. S.

589

Review.

Handbook of the Education (Scotland) Act, 1872. Containing-I. A Digest of the Act, with Subjects grouped for the convenience of School boards; II. Copy of the Act, with Explanatory Notes; III. Appendix, including the Incorporated Acts, Industrial Schools Act (1866); IV. Highland Schools Act 1873, Scotch Education Code 1873, Index, etc. etc. By JAMES TOD, Advo

cate. Fifth Edition. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas.

THE appreciation which the public has already shewn of Mr. Tod's excellent manual is its highest recommendation, and a long review of it would be entirely out of place at this time of day. The present edition contains upwards of 100 pages of new matter, including the New Education Code, the Highland Schools Act of 1873, etc. One of the most important additions is the Set of Rules for planning and fitting up Schools issued by the Education Department (pp. 214-219). This is to be found in no other treatise on the Act. Another is the collection of Decisions under the Act by Sheriffs, many of which have been reported in our own pages, but all of which Mr. Tod has carefully digested, and verified by private information. The new index is very carefully prepared, and we believe will be found quite exhaustive.

We cordially recommend Mr. Tod's book to all who wish to have complete information not only as to the Act and its history, but as to everything that has been done in the execution of its provisions up to the present moment. It is a model of diligent and conscientious care in every particular, and ought to in the hands of every member of a school board.

The Month.

Opening of the Winter Session. -The legal year has begun quietly and with a fair prospect of business. The calling list and single bills are fairly filled; but few causes are of magnitude or interest. No rumours of personal or political changes have excited the legal mind. Even the persistently recurring belief that Lord Jerviswoode means to retire from the bench, having now served for the period which entitles him to his full pension, creates little interest. There are few judges who (if this belief be well founded) will leave the bench with more hearty wishes for their happiness in private life. During the greater part of his term of office in the Outer House, Lord Jerviswoode was one of the most popular Lords Ordinary, and his careful and well-considered judgments were very rarely re