strange to treat them as separate and distinct. Indeed, it would be easy without any express appointment of new trustees, simply to convey to them upon the trusts, which would have precisely the same effect as an express appointment. The mere fact that an 'appointment of a new trustee' is mentioned in the schedule under a heading distinct from that of a 'conveyance not hereinbefore described,' is by no means conclusive of the question. The Act of 1870 was not, generally speaking, intended to introduce any new principle as to the levying of stamp duties, but to consolidate and embody the pre-existing law. Neither can we see that anything new has been effected by the provisions of the 8th section, subsec. 1. The case really seems to come within the principle of the illustration given by the late Mr. Tilsley (Stamp Laws, 336, 3rd edit.) of an appointment in execution of a power-a declaration of uses or trusts and also a revocation of uses or trusts contained in a deed, on which, as he says, 'only one duty will attach, as on a deed not otherwise charged.' It is remarkable in regard to the illustration thus given, that if reference be made to the schedule, it will be found that appointment of a new trustee is charged, uno flatu, by the very same sentence, and with the very same duty, as the appointment in execution of a power of any property, etc., the words being 'appointment of a new trustee and appointment in. execution of a power of any property, or of any use, share, or interest in any property by any instrument not being a will...10s. And see sec. 78.'

"It would be curious if one rule as to stamps should be applied to the appointment of property, and another to the appointment of a trustee, when both are charged by the same sentence with identical duties. The headings of conveyance in the schedule, which do not exclusively relate to sales or mortgages, all contain a reference to the 78th section. The proviso to this section, and the reference to this section under the heading 'Appointment,' we conceive were added ex majori cautela, for the purpose of making it abundantly clear that 10s., the ordinary deed stamp, was sufficient in the case of an appointment of a new trustee, and a conveyance or transfer accompanying or consequent thereon, coming within the head, Conveyance or Transfer of any kind not hereinbefore described.' The conveyance, it may not unfairly be said, was incidental to the appointment.

"The decisions under the repealed Acts, which show the sufficiency of the ordinary deed stamp in cases similar to that which we are discussing, appear to be applicable. We may mention in particular Jones v. Sandys (Barnes' Notes, 463); Doe v. Wheeler (4 Nev. and Man. 10); Doe v. Fereday (12 Ad. and Ell. 23). Bearing in mind the general principle, that every charge upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous words, we scarcely think that th claim for double duty will meet with any favour from the Courts."

Some Personal Items. - Since our last issue it has been announced

that it is Her Majesty's pleasure to confer a peerage on the Lord Justice-Clerk by the title of Lord Moncreiff of Tullibole. It will be remembered that at his appointment as Lord JusticeClerk Mr. Moncreiff was made a Baronet. Lord Moncreiff of Tullibole was called to the Bar in 1833, was appointed SolicitorGeneral in February 1850, and Lord Advocate in April 1851. He held that office till the retirement of Lord John Russell's ministry in March 1852, but resumed it on the appointment of the Aberdeen Government in December 1852, and continued to hold it till February 1858. He was a third time Lord Advocate from June 1859 until July 1866, and was reappointed a fourth time in December 1868; this time leaving the office only for the presidency of the Second Division. He sat in Parliament for the Leith Burghs from 1851 to 1859, for Edinburgh from 1859 to 1868, and for the Universities of Glasgow and Aberdeen from December 1868 until his retirement to the Bench in October 1869. He was elected Dean of the Faculty of Advocates in 1858, when the present Lord Justice-General left the bar to become Lord Justice-Clerk.

From the Sheriff Court Act of 1853, and even earlier, down till 1868, the name of Lord Advocate Moncreiff was connected with many of the most important measures passed or attempted by the legislature; it was associated with every department of the government of Scotland; and he had signalized himself by his remarkable eloquence and staunch usefulness to his party in almost every political conflict and emergency in those eventful years. He was more of a politician than a Scots lawyer; for it is one of the misfortunes of the Scotch Bar that when an advocate attains its highest prize he must cease in a great measure to belong to the Bar. Some men possibly do so, because they are elated by the possession of power and position, and willingly forget the pit out of which they were dug, but, in most cases, the separation is due to no such unworthy feeling, but to the fact that Parliamentary life and the political duties of the office are every year making more exclusive and irresistible demands. To hold the office indeed in these times, as recent experience shows, costs a lawyer in large practice the absolute loss of some thousands a year.

Although, however, Lord Moncreiff's peerage must be regarded as in some measure a reward for great services rendered in London, rather than a prize falling to him as a member of our profession, the law claims a right to a special share in the satisfaction with which the bestowal of the honour has been received. It is something that a second peerage should be won by a Scottish lawyer; and it is still more that the profession should be so worthily represented in the highest assembly in the Empire.

With what ulterior views, if any, the honour has been given or accepted, we do not venture to suggest. All or most of the talk on this subject with which our ears are wearied is, we hesitate not to say, mere speculation. Only this is certain that there is no immediate possibility of Lord Moncreiff being asked to exchange his present judicial position for a, still higher one in London, for the very simple reason that no higher office exists there to which he could be appointed. And there was certainly no expectation or intention in any quarter that he should devote himself to the lofty but unremunerated duties of a "law lord."

The news that a painful disease of some duration had necessitated the amputation of Sheriff Glassford Bell's right arm was the cause of very general regret. In the position which he holds as the Sheriff of the most important county in Scotland, a position considerably more important and responsible than that of a Lord Ordinary, Sheriff Bell has won golden opinions from all sorts of men both by his conduct as a judge and his demeanour as a conspicuous public official. It is therefore with some anxiety that his progress towards recovery has been watched; for, if he were unfortunately compelled to resign, his place is one which it will be very difficult to fill.

It is indeed unfortunate that no constitutional means exists, short of an Act of Parliament, by which the temporary or permanent disability of a principal Sheriff can be provided for. During the last illness of Sir Walter Scott, an Act of Parliament had to be passed to enable the Crown to appoint a qualified person to perform the necessary duties of Sheriff of Selkirkshire, he being "incapacitated by disease from performing any of the functions of his office or appointing any substitute for their due performance" (2 & 3 Will. IV. cap. 101). No means has yet been provided for appointing an interim Sheriff for the appeal work which no substitute can perform; and therefore that must of necessity fall into arrear during a long illness. It may seem proper that the Court of Session should make an interim appointment; but it is understood that the Court entertains doubt as to this, and at all events would be unwilling to assume such a power even if asked by the representatives of the Crown.

Some observations in our last number have called forth a letter from an able correspondent on a subject akin to this, the retiring allowances of Judges and Sheriffs. Our correspondent is shocked that a number of frail, but venerable gentlemen should be compelled by the parsimony of their country to continue to toil in the judicial mill at ages when it would be better for the public, if not for themselves, that they should resign. It had not previously occurred to us that retiring allowances were inadequate, and we thought that it was not the general opinion of the profession that Judges generally persisted in cumbering the Bench in Edinburgh, London, or the provinces for the reason assigned by our correspondent. We regret that his communication is too late for insertion in this number; but we shall endeavour, though we shall not promise, to let him speak for himself in our next.

The Question whether a Law-agent can be compelled to disclose his

Client's address, was discussed in the case of Tod's Trustee v. Officer, July 17, 1872, and a decision was given in the negative. But the judgment was rested there on the special terms of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act, secs. 90 and 91, which limit the examination of the witnesses specified to questions "relating to the bankrupt's affairs." The general question of confidentiality was argued, but not decided. It was lately however considered by Lord Justice James in Ex parte Campbell, in re Cathcart, L. R. 5 Ch. 703. In his lordship's view, if a solicitor knows where his client is from some source other than the confidential statement of the client himself, made sub sigillo confessionis for the purpose of obtaining the solicitor's professional advice and assistance, the solicitor cannot protect himself on the ground of his client's privilege; and in such a case it is immaterial that he gained his knowledge of his client's residence solely in consequence of being his legal adviser. If, however, the client is in hiding, or is concealing his residence, and the solicitor is in a position to say that he only knows his client's residence, because the client had communicated it to him confidentially as his solicitor for the purpose of being advised by him, then the client's residence is a matter of professional confidence. On commenting on the decision, the Solicitors' Journal says, "The recent case of Heath v. Creelock, L. R., 15 Eq. 257, seems to fall within this latter description. It came before the court on an application by the plaintiffs that the defendant's solicitor should disclose the address of their client. The defendant was a trustee who had acted fraudulently and gone abroad. He was defending the suit; and the plaintiffs, being desirous of serving notice of a subpæna ad testificandum upon him personally, made the present application. The authorities adduced in support of the motion were Ramsbotham v. Senior, L. R., 8 Eq. 566, and Burton v. Earl Darnley, 17 W. R. 1,057, L. R., 8 Eq. 575, in note. In both these cases the whereabouts of wards of court was being concealed for the purpose of keeping them out of the reach of the court, or of the guardian appointed by the court; and it was held by Vice-Chancellor Malins that a solicitor is not at liberty, in consequence of any privilege of the client, to conceal any fact which may enable the court to discover the residence of its wards. It is plain that these cases afforded no support to the present application.'

Warranty and Concealment of Material Facts in Life Insurance. -The case of the Life Association of Scotland v. Foster, January 31, 1873, decided a curious point in the law of life insurance. The insured signed a proposal for an assurance on her own life, with a declaration that she was "in good health, not being afflicted with any disorder internal or external," and agreed that that declaration should be the basis of the contract. She answered in the negative the question of the insurance company's medical officer whether she had rupture; and made a general statement in writing that her answers to the various questions put to her were faithful and true. The company sought to reduce the policy, after her death, on the grounds of breach of warranty and concealment of material facts; and they proved at the trial that when the policy was entered into the insured had a small swelling on the groin, which is a symptom of rupture, and had not disclosed it. It was proved, however, that she did not know it to be such a symptom, and did not consider it of any importance. With regard to the question of warranty the First Division held that the warranty by the insured of the truth of her statements about her health was not a warranty that she had no disease, but only that she had none so far as she knew. It may also be held that her failure to disclose the fact that she had a swelling on the groin was not a sufficient ground for setting aside the policy, because she did not know it to be material, and persons without medical knowledge could not be expected to know it to be

SO.

The judgments are interesting, though they appear to us to be (except Lord Jerviswoode's) unnecessarily long. We give as a pendant the judgment in Schaible v. Washington Life Insurance Company of New York, decided in the District Court of Philadelphia, on July 12, 1873, in which a similar point was decided. In this case, however, the answers to the interrogatories accompanying an application for a life insurance were representations and not warranties; and the question was, whether the answers were made in good faith, or falsely and fraudulently. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff upon competent and satisfactory evidence, and the Court refused a new trial, although it appeared by a post mortem examination that the answers were erroneous in point of fact. The following is the opinion by Thayer, J.:

"This was an action upon a policy of insurance for $5,000, upon the life of Eureika Randon.

"The defence was alleged fraudulent representations in the application. The assured died suddenly ten days after the application was made, and the weight of the evidence undoubtedly was, that she died of an abscess in the right lung. A post mortem examination made at the request of the defendants revealed the fact that the right lung was much diseased. The left lung and the other vital organs presented a normal appearance. Previous to the insurance the deceased was examined by Dr. Griffith, a regular physician, employed by the company for that purpose, who testified on the trial that he had been an examining physician for the company in at least one hundred cases, and that the deceased appeared at the time of her examination to be in good health. He had given a certificate accordingly to the company.

"The insurance agent who brought the application to the company testified that he had previously procured a large number of insurances for the company, and that he saw no evidences of the disease whatever in Eureika Randon at the time her application was made. Nine witnesses, acquaintances and friends of the deceased, some of whom had seen her within three or four days of the time of her death, testified that she was a healthy looking woman, presenting no outward indications whatever of disease, and that they thought her in good health at that time. There was hardly a breath of testimony to contradict or rebut these statements. The husband of the deceased kept an eating-house, and the deceased was engaged almost up to the day of her death in superintending the active duties of the establishment.

"Annexed to the answers of the assured to the usual interrogatories appended