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The Federalist: On the New Constitution, Written in 1788
Alexander Hamilton,James Madison,John Jay
Affichage du livre entier - 1842
The Federalist, on the New Constitution: Written in 1788
Alexander Hamilton,James Madison,John Jay
Affichage du livre entier - 1818
admit advantage ALEXANDER HAMILTON America appear appointment army articles of confederation authority bill of rights body branch Britain causes circumstances citizens commerce common confederacy confederation congress consequence consideration considered convention council courts danger declare defence duty effect elections equal eral ernment established executive executive power exercise existing experience extent favor federacy federal government Federalist force foreign former France house of representatives impeachments important influence instance interest JAMES MADISON jealousy judges judicial judiciary jurisdiction lative latter laws legislative legislature less liberty Macedon magistrate means ment militia national government nature necessary necessity North Carolina objects obligations observations operation particular parties peace persons political possess president principle proper proportion proposed constitution propriety provision PUBLIUS question reason regulation render republic republican requisite respect senate supposed supreme thing tion treaties trial by jury union United vested votes
Page 443 - State, or its trade ; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any State, in time of peace, except such number only, as in the judgment of the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defence of such State...
Page 444 - United States in Congress assembled, and then only against the kingdom or State and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States in Congress assembled, unless such State be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States in Congress assembled shall determine otherwise.
Page 157 - States, to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and to report such an act for that purpose to the United States in Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state, will effectually provide for the same.
Page 445 - The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective States...
Page 444 - No state shall engage in any war without the consent of the united states in congress assembled...
Page 216 - The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.
Page 459 - In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each state in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected...
Page 193 - The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments, are numerous and indefinite.
Page 208 - An elective despotism was not the government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.