...locus of empty reference. Ontology is the “re/collection” that phenomenology requires in order to “watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire..?' (Merleau-Ponty 1962, xiii). Without ontology, there would be no fire. Without phenomenology, there...

...Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly...it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical. Husserl's transcendental is not Kant's and Husserl accuses Kant's philosophy of being ‘worldly'....

...Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly...it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical. (PhP viii/xiii) In keeping with his earlier formulations of the reduction, Merleau-Ponty portrays it...

...Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly...it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical. Husserl's transcendental is not Kant's and Husserl accuses Kant's philosophy of being 'worldly', because...

...Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly...it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical. Husserl's transcendental is not Kant's and Husserl accuses Kant's philosophy of being ‘worldly',...

..."Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice" (PP, viii; E, xiii). So, Husserl's phenomenology can be interpreted as a radicalization of Descartes's...

...Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly...it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical” (xiii). In a discussion of Fink's fidelity to Husserl's thought in his work entitled “Representation...

...phenomenology is precisely a philosophy that will achieve this result; phenomenological reflection, he says. ‘steps back to watch the forms of transcendence...us to the world and thus brings them to our notice' (p. 70; PP xiii (xv)). In doing this, philosophy brings to our attention the ways in which we are ‘condemned',...

...phenomenology is precisely a philosophy that will achieve this result; phenomenological reflection, he says, ‘steps back to watch the forms of transcendence...us to the world and thus brings them to our notice' (p. 70; PP xiii [xv]). In doing this, philosophy brings to our attention the ways in which we are ‘condemned',...

...mundane. To call to mind the words of Merleau-Ponty, we might say that the transcendental “spectator” “slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our attention.” Although Husserl keeps returning to a description of the transcendental “spectator”...